Let L be a language decided by a constant-round Arthur-Merlin (AM) protocol with negligible soundness error and all but possibly the last message being classical. We prove that if this protocol is zero knowledge with a black-box, quantum simulator S, then L ∈ BQP. Our result also applies to any language having a three-round classical interactive proof with negligible soundness error and a black-box quantum simulator. These results in particular disallow parallel composition of certain protocols in order to reduce soundness error while maintaining zero knowledge with a black-box quantum simulator, unless BQP = N P . They generalize analogous classical results of Goldreich and Krawczyk (1990) , who showed that when S is a black-box, classical simulator, then L ∈ BPP.
Introduction
Zero-knowledge protocols play a central role in cryptography. Such protocols allow a prover to convince a verifier that he knows a secret, without disclosing any extra information about the secret. That is, anything efficiently computable after interacting with the prover could also have been efficiently computed without the interaction.
Interactive protocols must be secure as well as round-efficient, in practice. For general interactive proofs, parallel composition is widely used to decrease the error probability without increasing the number of rounds. Therefore, for practical cryptographic applications, one is interested in parallel-composing zero-knowledge protocols while maintaining the zero-knowledge property.
Goldreich and Krawczyk [GK90] proved a result concerning the round complexity of zeroknowledge interactive proofs: only BPP languages have three-round interactive proofs with negligible soundness error which are black-box simulation zero knowledge. This precludes parallel composition of many of the well-known zero-knowledge protocols -e.g., for Graph Isomorphism, for Graph 3-Colorability and generally, for all N P [GMW91] -while maintaining black-box zero knowledge, unless the languages are in BPP. [GK90] also show that for ArthurMerlin interactive proofs -in which the verifier's messages are his fair coin tosses -the above result can be extended to protocols with any constant number of rounds.
Loosely speaking, we say that an interactive proof deciding a language L is black-box simulation zero-knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time simulator which using any verifier V * as a black box, on inputs in L produces a probability distribution which is indistinguishable from the distribution of conversations of V * with the prover.
The development of quantum computation over recent years has significant potential influences on cryptography. Exponential speedups by quantum computers have been found for problems that play a crucial role in current cryptographic systems. In the context of zero knowledge, it is interesting to ask what would happen if one weakens the zero-knowledge requirement to say that for x ∈ L a possibly dishonest Arthur learns nothing more after interacting with the prover than what he could determine with a black-box quantum simulator, with no interaction? Perhaps black-box quantum simulators are sufficiently more powerful than classical ones that round-efficient protocols could exist for more interesting languages L. After all, Watrous has given a black-box quantum simulator for the standard three-round Graph Isomorphism protocol which succeeds with probability exactly one [W06] , whereas classical simulators for the same protocol succeed with probability only approaching one. Perhaps quantum exact simulators would be helpful in maintaining black-box zero knowledge under parallel composition.
We note that constant-round AM protocols are particularly well-motivated in the quantum setting, as Watrous has also shown that any language with an honest-verifier quantum statistical zero-knowledge protocol has a quantum statistical zero-knowledge AM protocol with exponentially small completeness error and soundness error exponentially close to 1/2 [W02] .
In this work, we prove that the quantum-simulator situation is analogous to the classicalsimulator situation studied by Goldreich and Krawczyk. Only BQP languages have constant-round AM protocols with negligible soundness error, which are black-box quantum simulation zero knowledge. 1
Techniques
Our proof is by exhibiting an efficient algorithm for the language L. For simplicity, assume a three-round AM protocol for L, so the quantum simulator S outputs a transcript (A, B, C). The first two outputs, A and B, are classical; and our arguments will not depend on whether the third message is classical or quantum.
Idea of the algorithm: Choose H uniformly from a strongly (2t + 1)-universal family of hash functions, where t is S's running time (i.e., the random variables {H(α)} α are uniform and (2t + 1)-wise independent). Run S on a verifier who replies deterministically H(α) to first message α. Declare x ∈ L iff the honest verifier would accept the transcript (A, H(A), C). This is nearly the same algorithm as used by [GK90] , except (t + 1)-wise independence sufficed in the classical case. Our algorithm is quantum because S is.
For x ∈ L, it can be verified that the algorithm accepts. The interesting case is when x / ∈ L. We show that if the algorithm accepts a string x / ∈ L with probability ǫ, then there exists a cheating Merlin who fools the honest Arthur with probability Ω(ǫ/t 2 ). This contradicts the protocol's soundness being non-negligible for ǫ constant and t polynomial. (In the classical case, the cheating Merlin's success probability is ǫ/t, so a quantum black-box simulator can be no more than quadratically more efficient.) Indeed, the cheating Merlin simply sends Arthur α drawn from the distribution of A, S's first output message. He receives in response a uniformly random B ′ . If H(A) conditioned on A = α is "well spread out," then the distribution of Arthur's response B ′ can be closely coupled with that of H(A)|(A = α) from S's output. Therefore, if the algorithm likely accepts, then sending γ according to C|(A = α ∧ H(A) = B ′ ) will likely fool Arthur.
The main technical lemma of our paper shows that for most α, H(A) conditioned on A = α cannot be very concentrated (averaged over H). This is achieved via a reduction to blackbox search. Intuitively, no classical algorithm making t queries to a random oracle, and then outputting one of the oracle's responses, can concentrate the oracle to a set of fractional size less than 1/t. It turns out that no quantum algorithm (nor in particular S) can concentrate the oracle to a set of fractional size < 1/t 2 . Here, however, the search is structured, since the black-box oracle is a hash function. However, we argue that with t queries, no quantum algorithm can distinguish between a uniformly random oracle and a (2t + 1)-wise independent oracle, so lower bounds for unstructured search apply.
Our analysis of the algorithm is not analogous to the analysis of [GK90] . A first minor difference is that we cannot construct a hash function on the fly as they do, because the simulator's queries can be in superposition. More importantly, their argument that if the algorithm accepts an x not in L then there exists a cheating prover is essentially combinatorial; it can be seen as inserting the honest Arthur into a random query round of the simulator. But here, the simulator can make queries in quantum superposition even for messages which are classical in the protocol, so it doesn't make sense to insert the honest Arthur into a simulator query. Our argument cannot rely just on classical combinatorics, but with a careful rephrasing, it turns out that the analysis can be reduced to quantum search lower bounds.
Why does the algorithm use hash functions, instead of running the simulator on the honest Arthur? The answer is that for x / ∈ L, we still want to be sure that the simulator's output is fairly uniformly distributed, even conditioned on its first message. (Zero knowledge alone only restricts the simulator's behavior when x ∈ L.) Hash functions let us guarantee that the second message is not too concentrated. Hash functions work well for the x ∈ L case, too, because the transcript with a random hash function verifier is the same, on average over H, as the transcript with the honest verifier.
Since the input to the search algorithm we generate is coming from a source of limited independence, a technical contribution of this work is in showing that search is hard on average for such inputs as well. The limited independence of the hash functions was necessary in the first place to sample them efficiently.
Additional results and open problems
We also prove that no three-round interactive proof with a fully classical verifier and negligible soundness error can be black-box quantum simulation zero knowledge, except for languages in BQP -analogous to another result of [GK90] (for a black-box classical simulator and BPP). The proof is similar to that for AM protocols, except now we run the simulator on deterministic verifiers which use as their (private) random coins the hash of the prover's first message. Again, this in particular rules out parallel repetition of such protocols while maintaining black-box zero knowledge. To our knowledge, no previous results on the parallel composition of quantum zero-knowledge protocols were known. We show our results for computational zero knowledge and therefore they apply as well for the stricter notions of statistical and perfect zero knowledge.
Many open problems remain related to this work. We would like to be able to analyze protocols with more "quantum-ness." For example, what can one say about three-round interactive proofs with classical messages but a quantum verifier? Here, the honest verifier may not even have any private coins, but instead may use quantum mechanics to randomize. But then there is nowhere for us even to put the output of a hash function! We would also like to understand AM protocols in which all the messages are quantum. But then it is no longer true that the honest-verifier transcript is the same as the average of the hash-function verifiers transcripts. Hashing a quantum message collapses its state. (Note that the definition of zero knowledge must also be changed for quantum verifiers -simulating the coins and transcript is no longer enough, and the transcript may not even be well-defined. Instead, a proper definition requires the simulator to output the state of the verifier [W02] . However, in our paper, the classical definition suffices because only the last message is allowed to be quantum.)
Organization
We define our models in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, we give the proof for three-round AM protocols, up to technical Lemma 1 on concentration which is proved in Sec. 4. We then generalize the three-round AM proof in two directions. First, we extend its validity to three-round IP (private-coin) protocols in Sec. 5. Next, Sec. 6 generalizes to constant-round AM protocols, requiring slightly more involved notation.
Preliminaries
Call a function δ negligible, δ ∈ negl(n), if for every polynomial p and for sufficiently large n, δ(n) < 1/p(n). 2. Arthur replies with a uniformly random β ∈ {0, 1} n 2 , independent of the first message.
Arthur-Merlin protocol

Merlin sends γ and Arthur decides to accept or reject based on an efficient check on x
and the transcript (α, β, γ).
Here α, β and γ are polynomially long in n. Note that there are no efficiency requirements on Merlin. Let A, M (x) denote the distribution of protocol transcripts between Arthur and Merlin. The protocol satisfies, for some ǫ C , ǫ S > 0 with ǫ C + ǫ S < 1:
• Soundness: For x / ∈ L, then for any possibly cheating Merlin M * ,
A constant-round AM protocol is defined similarly -all of Arthur's responses must be fair and independent random coins.
In contrast to AM protocols, in a general interactive proof (IP) system (Sec. 5), the classical verifier is allowed to flip private coins and to compute each of his responses as a function of his coin flips.
In the proof of Theorem 1, it will not matter if γ is classical or quantum, nor if Arthur's acceptance predicate is classical or quantum. When we consider IP(3) protocols in Sec. 5, however, it will be important that the verifier's first message is a deterministic function of classical coin flips.
Zero knowledge
A zero-knowledge proof for a language L is an interactive proof for L such that if x ∈ L, then any verifier V * learns nothing more than the validity of the assertion that x ∈ L [GMR89, GO93]. (Even "dishonest" verifiers not following the protocol -V * = V -are allowed.) The notion of the verifier not "learning" more is formalized by exhibiting an algorithm S * (x) called the simulator which when x ∈ L produces the view (private coins and transcript) of V * at the end of its interaction with the prover P, P, V * (x). More precisely, Definition 2 (Zero Knowledge). A protocol with prover P is zero knowledge -either perfect, statistical, or computational -on inputs from L and for verifiers in V, if: for every V * ∈ V, there exists a probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm S * such that for all x ∈ L, the two probability distributions S * (x) and P, V * (x) are
the same (perfect zero knowledge), OR
statistically indistinguishable (statistical zero knowledge), OR
computationally indistinguishable (computational zero knowledge).
Black-box simulation zero knowledge is a stronger definition, requiring the existence of one simulator S that uses any verifier only as a black-box oracle to produce its view.
(In the classical case, the zero-knowledge property concerns the distribution of possible conversations between the prover and verifier from the verifier's point of view. The important property is that the verifier's state after any messages can be efficiently reconstructed from the transcript and private randomness. For protocols with quantum messages, or with a quantum verifier, it is this property which should be maintained. We shan't need them here, but for precise definitions please refer to [W02, W06] .)
Quantum oracle
A quantum oracle U f for a function f : {0, 1} n 1 → {0, 1} n 2 is the unitary taking
for any x ∈ {0, 1} n 1 , a ∈ {0, 1} n 2 , and arbitrary b (⊕ is the exor operation). Note U f is its own inverse, so oracle access to U f and U † f is no more powerful than oracle access to just U f .
Main result
There exists H = H(2t + 1), a strongly (2t + 1)-universal family of efficiently computable hash functions {0, 1} n 1 → {0, 1} n 2 [J74, WC81, CG89]. That is, for H chosen uniformly from H, H(α) is uniformly distributed for each α ∈ {0, 1} n 1 ; and the set of variables {H(α) : α ∈ {0, 1} n 1 } are (2t+1)-wise independent. For h ∈ H, let A h represent a deterministic (dishonest) Arthur who replies β = h(α) on message α. We prove: 
In the case that γ is quantum, the simulator's output must be quantum-computational zero knowledge (i.e., indistinguishable under quantum-computationally efficient tests). In particular, if ǫ S is negligible and ǫ C a constant, then L ∈ BQP. Theorem 1 follows from an analysis of algorithm Z in Claim 1.
Algorithm Z: Input x ∈ {0, 1} n , Output accept/reject.
1. Draw H uniformly from H(2t + 1). Run S on A H and measure its output (A, B, C) = S(x, A H ). (If the third message is supposed to be quantum, then measure just A and B.)
Accept if and only if Arthur A accepts the transcript (A, H(A), C).
Claim 1. Algorithm Z runs in polynomial time, and satisfies:
1. For x ∈ L, Z accepts with probability ≥ 1 − ǫ C − negl(n).
For x /
∈ L, Z accepts with probability q = O(t √ ǫ S ).
Proof. Z is polynomial-time since S, choosing and evaluating a hash function in H, and Arthur's acceptance predicate are all efficient. Note that the first step of Z constructs a joint distribution (H, A, B, C).
Case x ∈ L:
Pr[Z accepts x] = Pr[A accepts (A, H(A), C)]
At the first inequality, we merely add a check to each term, which can only reduce the probability. The second inequality follows from the computational zero knowledge assumption.
Testing (h(α) = β ∧ A accepts (α, β, γ)) is efficient, so its probability on the simulated transcript (A, B, C), given H = h, can differ from its probability on the true protocol's transcript A h , M (x) only negligibly (and h(α) = β on A h , M (x) by definition). Finally, since H is drawn from a strongly (2t + 1)-universal hash family, in particular H(α) uniformly random for each α. Therefore, the average of the transcripts A h , M (x) is distributed identically to A, M (x) -in either case, Arthur's message is uniformly random.
Case x / ∈ L: We will show that if Z accepts some x / ∈ L with probability q, then there exists a cheating Merlin M * such that Pr(Arthur accepts A, M * (x)) = Ω(q 2 /t 2 ). This along with the soundness criterion implies:
Cheating Merlin M * Recall the joint distribution (H, A, B, C) defined in step one of Z.
1. On input x, send an α drawn according to A. M * is not necessarily efficient, and need not be. Intuitively, M * is only successful if the uniform distribution of β has sufficient overlap with the distribution of H(A) from the simulator's output, at least for most A. Then the two distributions can be coupled, relating Arthur's acceptance probability to q. (An extreme counterexample might be that conditioned on A = a, H(A) were somehow fixed. Then β would almost never agree with H(A), so M * wouldn't know what to send for the last message.)
On receiving Arthur's uniform coins β, reply according to
Now the zero knowledge property does not apply when x / ∈ L, so it is possible that the simulator's output (A, B, C) could be very different from A, M (x). Regardless, we show that according to black-box query search lower bounds, H(A) is on average not too concentrated even given A:
The proof is in Sec. 4. 1. Pr(A ∈ Good) ≥ 1 − δ.
For some constant c and all
The cheating probability, Pr[A accepts A, M * (x)], is, by definition of M * , (α,β)∈{0,1} n 1 +n 2 
Proof of Lemma 1 -Reduction to search
Lemma 1 is proved by reduction to search, then applying a search lower bound. The idea, briefly, is to let β α be a string achieving s α . The simulator S outputs an A, with Pr[H(A) = β A ] = s. Now define a verifier oracle X by choosing each X α uniformly at random and independently. Let (A X , B X , C X ) = S(x, X) the simulator's output when run on X. Let s ′ be the probability that X A X = β A X . By standard search lower bounds, the probability of this event for any algorithm using t queries -and in particular for the simulator -is O(t 2 /2 n 2 ). Finally, s ′ = s because the hash functions have sufficient independence. We elaborate the details of this sketch below.
Proposition 1. Fix a sequence (β α ) α∈{0,1} n 1 of elements of {0, 1} n 2 . Let A ∈ {0, 1} n 1 be the (classical, random) output of a quantum algorithm A making at most t oracle queries to H, a uniformly random hash function from H = H(2t + 1). Then
(If A is a classical algorithm making at most t oracle queries to H, then s = O(t/2 n 2 ).)
To prove Lemma 1, we simply apply this proposition to the simulator, A = S, and to the particular sequence β α ≡ arg max
where the probability is over the joint distribution of (H, A, B, C) from algorithm Z.
Proof. The proof of Prop. 1 has two steps. First, we show that, because A makes at most t oracle queries, we can forget about H being a strongly (2t + 1)-universal family of hash functions, and instead just consider A run on a uniformly random function. Second, we give a reduction from search.
Lemma 2. Let A = A H be the result of running a quantum algorithm A using t oracle queries to H and measuring its output. Let A ′ = A F be the measured output of A on F a uniformly random function {0, 1} n 1 → {0, 1} n 2 . Then A and A ′ have the same distribution.
Proof. The state of the quantum query algorithm A after t queries to (x α ) α∈{0,1} n 1 is
where the coefficients p z (x) are polynomials in the binary variables x α,i with α ∈ {0, 1} n 1 and i ∈ [n 2 ] ≡ {1, . . . , n 2 }. A block, for any fixed α, consists of the variables x α,i with i ∈ [n 2 ]. Each p z (x) has block degree t, meaning that each term involves variables x α,i for at most t different αs:
Therefore, for a fixed oracle, the probability of measuring any particular output is a polynomial of block degree at most 2t [BBC + 98] . Averaging this polynomial over the oracle being H gives the same probability as averaging over F by strong 2t-universality -in either case, the variables x α are 2t-wise independent, uniformly random.
because A need not have queried its output A.) Now assume we are given a random instance of search with oracle access to a database X of size 2 n 2 . That is, exactly one (uniformly random) position is marked 1 and the other positions are marked 0. Standard search lower bounds imply that with t queries, the probability of a quantum algorithm finding a 1 is O(t 2 /2 n 2 ) [BBC + 98] . (For a classical algorithm, this probability is of course O(t/2 n 2 ).)
A can be used indirectly as a search algorithm for the database X. Fix a uniformly random function F : {0, 1} n 1 → {0, 1} n 2 . For each α ∈ {0, 1} n 1 , fix a uniformly random β ′ α ∈ {0, 1} n 2 {β α }. Then run A. When A makes a query to say α ∈ {0, 1} n 1 , return β α if X F (α) = 1 and β ′ α if X F (α) = 0. This response can be implemented in superposition, using at most two oracle queries to X: choose β α or β ′ α depending on X F (α) , then uncompute X F (α) . It is not necessarily efficient, except in terms of oracle queries. Finally, measure A's output, and apply F . Defining
f is a uniformly random function, just as in Lemma 2, and finding β α in f implies finding a 1 in X. Therefore, Pr[F (
is exactly the probability that we find a 1 in X using 2t queries. Search lower bounds imply Prop. 1.
5 Three-round protocols IP(3)
The extension of this result to a three-round interactive proof V, P is straightforward, and follows the same lines as in Ref. [GK90] . In an interactive proof, the honest verifier V is given random coins R at the beginning of the protocol, and replies to the prover's message α with β = V R (α). For a hash function h : {0, 1} n 1 → V's coins, define the dishonest verifier V h to respond instead with V h(α) (α) -i.e., V h hashes the prover's first message to generate its "randomness." V h 's view of the interaction is therefore (α, γ).
Theorem 2. Assume language L has a three-round interactive proof with 1 − ǫ C = Ω(1) and ǫ S = negl(n). Assume the existence of a quantum polynomial-time, black-box, computationalzero-knowledge simulator S working for all P, V h with h ∈ H = H(2t + 1), where S makes at most t queries. Then L ∈ BQP.
The proof of Theorem 2 is almost identical to that of Theorem 1, with only slight modifications to the algorithm and cheating prover.
Algorithm Z ′ : Input x ∈ {0, 1} n , Output accept/reject.
1. Choose H uniformly at random from H. Run S on V H and measure its output (A, C) = S(x, V H ).
Accept if and only if the honest verifier with random coins H(A), V H(A) , accepts the transcript (A, V H(A) (A), C).
Note that by Lemma 2,
where F is a uniformly random function {0, 1} n 1 → V's coins.
Cheating prover P * Define a joint distribution for (F, A, C) by (A, C) = S(x, V F ), where F is a uniformly random function.
1. On input x, send α drawn from A.
2. On receiving β = V R (α) from V, reply according to C conditioned on A = α and V F (A) (A) = β.
The only significant difference is in the analog to Eq. (3). Now we sum over the coins r instead of β. For the second inequality of Eq. (3) to go through, we need to prove that, for any α and r,
This is in fact the case since V r sees the same distribution of transcripts (A, C) when conditioned on F (α) = r as when conditioned on V F (α) (α) = V r (α):
Lemma 3. For all r, α, α ′ and γ ′ ,
Proof. S is a black-box simulator, so its outputs A and C are conditionally independent of {F (α)} α∈{0,1} n 1 given {V F (α) (α)} α . Since F 's values are independent of each other, for any fixed α, S's outputs are conditionally independent of F (α) given V F (α) (α) -as asserted.
Note that previously, in the AM case, it did not matter whether the honest verifier Arthur was quantum or classical. (By definition of AM, Arthur had to send only random coins, but his final acceptance predicate could be quantum.) Here, however, it is essential that the verifier be classical. If the honest verifier were quantum, then we might not be able to even define the verifiers {V h }, because there might not be any randomness locations into which to hash the prover's first message.
Also, while the three-round AM proof can be extended to constant-round AM protocols (Sec. 6), that will not occur here. Our proof only works for constant-round IP protocols if the honest verifier is guaranteed to use independent randomness to determine his response in each round. It breaks down if he refers to the same randomness for different messages, because then the black-box simulator's output transcript need not only depend on the verifier's first message -i.e., it may depend directly on the randomness behind that message -so the analog to Lemma 3 is false. In fact, assuming the existence of one-way functions, all languages in N P have constant-round, computational-zero-knowledge protocols with (classical) black-box simulators [GMW91] .
6 Constant-round AM protocols
The result for three-round AM protocols extends to (2k + 1)-round AM protocols, k constant. Messages will be written α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α 2k+1 , of respective lengths, n 1 , . . . , n 2k+1 . Assume w.l.o.g. the first message is from M. For an indexed variable x i , let x j 1 denote the j-tuple (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x j ).
For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, let H i = H i (2t + 1) be a strongly (2t + 1)-universal family of efficiently computable hash functions {0, 1} N i → {0, 1} n 2i , with
represent the deterministic For x ∈ L, Z accepts with good probability by the computational zero knowledge assumption and by averaging over the hash functions, as before.
We will focus on the x / ∈ L case. Define the cheating Merlin M * : If the transcript so far is α 2i 1 , M * sends the next message according to the distribution of A 2i+1 |A 2i 1 = α 2i 1 . If q is non-negligible for some x / ∈ L, we argue M * tricks Arthur into accepting with non-negligible probability, contradicting soundness.
Let α 2i (α ∈ Good] ≥ 1 − kδ.
